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I. INTRODUCTION 
As described in initial news reports, last term's decisions in Alden 
v. Maine and its companion cases2 drastically changed American fed-
eralism. Alden caps a line of recent cases on state immunity from suit. 
Among other things, these cases seem to hold that private individuals 
cannot sue states to recover monetary compensation for the violation 
of rights created by Congress solely under Article I of the Constitu-
tion.3 One accomplished legal affairs reporter concluded that these 
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1. 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267-68 (1999) (concluding that the states are free to refuse to 
open their own courts to a wide variety of suits brought against them by persons possessing 
rights under federal law). 
2. Alden's companion cases deal with specialized exceptions to state immunity from 
suit. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 
2219, 2226-27, 2229-31 (1999) (holding (1) that Congress's exceptional powers, under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to abrogate state immunity from suit extend only to 
circumstances in which abrogation is a reasonable way of protecting interests guaranteed 
by that Amendment and (2) finding that the state had not waived its immunity from suit); 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank and United States, 
119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210-11 (1999) (holding that Congress's exceptional powers, under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, to abrogate state immunity from suit extend only to suits to pro-
tect interests guaranteed by that amendment). For a fuller discussion of Congress's power 
to abrogate state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment and the limits on those 
powers that Alden's companion cases recognize, see infra note 8 and accompanying text. 
3. The first of the recent cases is Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Among 
other things, Seminole concluded that Congress has no power, under Article I alone, to 
create rights enforceable in federal court against unconsenting states. /d. at 65-66, 72-73 
(noting that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and 
Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal 
jurisdiction"); see also Gordon G. Young, Comment, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 56 Mo. L. REv. 
1411, 1428-33 (1997) (examining the possible implications of the Seminole holding on the 
development of state immunity jurisprudence). In this respect, Seminole overruled an ear-
lier decision, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which allows Article I "abro-
gation" of states' immunity from federal court suits. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 66. As a 
consequence of Seminole, suits to enforce statutory rights created under Article I cannot be 
brought against an unconsenting state in federal court unless the rights have vested as life, 
liberty or property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and Congress has 
440 
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cases "flatly reject the notion that federal laws take precedence over 
state authority."4 Others also saw the decisions as dire. By means of a 
droll hypothetical, Duke Law School professor, Walter Dellinger, ex-
plored just how far this line of cases might be pushed to undercut 
states' obligations to follow federal law. Here is Professor Dellinger, as 
introduced by National Public Radio reporter Nina Totenberg a few 
days after Alden was decided: 
NINA TOTENBERG reporting: 
The court's decisions granting new power to the states repre-
sent a vision of the American structure of government differ-
ent from the one that's prevailed for most of this century ... 
The court's rulings appear to give states such sweeping im-
munity that Duke law professor and former Solicitor General 
Walter Dellinger appeared before a group of reporters 
tongue-in-cheek to announce he was resigning his job in the 
private sector to run for governor of North Carolina. His 
one campaign pledge, he said, would be to repeal the state 
income tax and fund state education by establishing a state-
run company to manufacture and sell Nike knock-offs [in vi-
olation of federal trademark and minimum wage laws]. 
validly abrogated state immunity under that amendment. See infra notes 7, 20 and accom-
panying text. Because suits against officers seeking compensation from the state treasury 
for past state wrongs are also classified as against a state, these too cannot be permitted by 
Congress under its Article I powers. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-69 (1974) 
(permitting federal courts to issue orders against state officers compelling prospective 
compliance with federal law but prohibiting orders against state officers to pay damages 
out of state funds for past violations of federal law); see also infra notes 52-55 and accompa-
nying text. 
In simple terms, what Alden adds to this line of cases is protection of states from suits 
in their own courts asserting federal law violations. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266 (holding 
that "[i]n light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution, ... 
the States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the 
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation"). More technically, Alden finds 
that, generally, there is no federal compulsion for a state court to hear suits brought 
against their sovereigns based on federal law, except perhaps that created by or under the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth Amendments. For a more complete description of 
these cases and this doctrine, see infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text. See also Young, 
supra note 3, at 1428-45 (examining the possible ramifications of the Seminole holding on 
the development of state immunity jurisprudence). While, generally, state courts are not 
compelled by federal law to hear suits against their own sovereign unless the state waives its 
immunity or Congress enacts a valid law abrogating that immunity, there may be some 
circumstances in which such compulsion exists. See supra note 45 (dealing with possible 
exceptions for claims against the state involving takings of property or tax refunds). 
4. Joan Biskupic,Justices, 5-4, Strengthen State Rights, WASH. PosT, June 24, 1999, at AI. 
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Professor WALTER DELLINGER (Duke University): It will 
be very easy to make a considerable profit on these matters 
because we'll be paying $1.25 an hour to those who work in 
our copying facilities. This may be bad news for the business 
community, but it's certainly good news for the taxpayers 
and citizens of the state of North Carolina.5 
Are federal statutes, enacted under Congress's Article I powers, 
really no longer binding on the states as claimed by the first reporter 
mentioned above? That depends on whether, after Alden, there are 
consequences for a state's violating them. And, as it turns out, there 
are. Were Professor Dellinger Nike's lawyer in his hypothetical (or 
lawyer for the losing plaintiffs in Alden), his next step surely would be 
to sue the appropriate state officer in his official capacity to enjoin 
future violations of federal law. Supreme Court decisions continue to 
allow prospective suits of this sort, brought to subject states to federal 
control. To this extent, federal law remains supreme.6 
Despite this, the Alden line of cases may dramatically change fed-
eralism. It may (or as I suggest below it may not) be what it seems: a 
complete protection for states against having to pay compensation for 
wrongs to private interests created by Congress solely under that 
body's Article I powers. If it is a flat prohibition, then in some real 
sense, when legislating under Article I, Congress cannot create private 
rights against the states.7 But this is not clear. There are two remain-
5. WEEKEND EDITION SATURDAY (NPR radio broadcast, june 26, 1999). 
6. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) ("[I]ndividuals who, as officers of 
the State ... threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal 
nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal 
Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action."); see also 
Seminole, 517 U.S. at 52-57 (generally recognizing the validity offederal court suits brought 
to force state officers' prospective compliance with federal law); infra notes 50-51, 54-56 
and accompanying text (explaining the rationale for Ex parte Young actions). 
7. By "in some real sense" I recognize that, near the boundary line, the distinction 
between laws creating private rights and those creating public duties blurs, and the proper 
nomenclature is debatable. Certainly one might choose to describe an obligation created 
for the benefit of a private party, but ultimately enforceable only by governmental suit 
(such as a criminal contempt proceeding), as a private right. But it would be a marginal 
and debatable classification. 
As for the importance of which of Congress's powers to regulate is in play when it 
attempts to override or "abrogate" states' immunity from suit, Congress possesses the 
power, when legislating under the Fourteenth Amendment (and probably under the Thir-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments) to subject states to liability to suit in federal court (and 
probably in state court as well). See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (conclud-
ing that "Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of 
enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against 
States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts" (foot-
note omitted)). The power that the Court recognized in Congress to do the same, when 
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ing possibilities for compensation. The first is congressional abroga-
tion of state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. At least 
some statutory rights, created by Congress under its Article I powers, 
will become property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.8 Under current law, Congress has power to abrogate states' im-
munity from suits brought to enforce such rights. But just how far the 
Fourteenth Amendment can be used for these purposes is less than 
legislating under Article I (Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989)) was repu-
diated in Seminole, 517 U.S. at 65-66. See supra note 3. 
8. Alden's two companion cases addressed this possibility, as did one Supreme Court 
case decided as this Article went to press. In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Education Expense Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999), decided the same day as Alden, one of 
the plaintiff's contentions was that the state had violated property rights created by Con-
gress under its Article I powers to regulate commerce, thus allowing Congress to abrogate 
state immunity to protect property under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. /d. at 
2224-25. As for the need for a basis of abrogation in the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra 
notes 6-7 and accompanying text. The College Savings Bank majority seemed to recognize 
that Congress possesses some power to abrogate state immunity under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, with respect to claims against states for deprivations of property 
created by Congress under Article I. 119 S. Ct. at 2224-25. It left open the possibility that 
Congress might abrogate state immunity to a trademark infringement suit, while distin-
guishing the unfair competition suit before it as in no sense involving a deprivation of 
property that could be regulated by Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Flor-
ida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank and United States, 119 
S. Ct. 2199 (1999), the Court confronted a patent infringement claim against the State of 
Florida. The majority rejected Congress's attempt to expose states to such suits while rec-
ognizing that patent rights were property rights whose violation might allow congressional 
authorization of a suit against an offending state in an appropriate circumstance. /d. at 
2206-09. Among other things it was (1) the lack of evidence of systematic and intentional 
violation of federally created property rights and (2) the lack of evidence that state law 
remedies were inadequate that caused the Court to find no deprivation of property cogni-
zable under the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, no power of Congress, under Section 5 
of that amendment, to abrogate immunity as an appropriate way of enforcing the Amend-
ment itself. Finally, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000), a majority of 
the Court found that the provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
purporting to abrogate state immunity were beyond Congress's powers of remediation 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
A review of the ADEA's legislative record as a whole, then, reveals that Congress 
had virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were unconsti-
tutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of age. Although 
that lack of support is not determinative of the § 5 inquiry, ... Congress' failure 
to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination here con-
firms that Congress had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation 
was necessary in this field. In light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's sub-
stantive requirements, and the lack of evidence of widespread and unconstitu-
tional age discrimination by the States, we hold that the ADEA is not a valid 
exercise of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
ADEA's purported abrogation of the States' sovereign immunity is accordingly 
invalid. 
/d. at 649 (citations omitted). 
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certain.9 This Article, however, focuses on another mechanism for 
compensation, based on the assumption that a Fourteenth Amend-
ment protective cocoon will be unavailable at least for some rights 
created under Article 1.10 This second mechanism is compensation by 
means of civil contempt actions for state violations of federal court 
injunctions. If this option is available, it would reach a great deal, 
though not all, 11 of the harm resulting from state violations of federal 
laws based on Article I. 
Imagine that Nike, in the hypothetical above, or the losing plain-
tiffs in Alden, do procure a federal court injunction, as indeed they 
may under existing law, and that the state violates it. Will they go 
uncompensated for all of the harm that they suffer because of a viola-
tion of their federal rights, as fortified by the injunction? One 
Supreme Court case, Hutto v. Finney, 12 suggests strongly that a state 
must pay, via civil contempt or other similar proceedings, for most 
harm to federal rights protected by the injunction. This interpreta-
tion of Hutto is supported by a Court of Appeals opinion written by 
Judge Richard Posner. 13 On this view, it would be meaningful to say 
that Congress can pursue its Article I objectives by the creation of ( 1) 
public regulatory schemes, enforceable by government14 or private 
9. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (indicating that the Court will scrutinize 
congressional attempts to abrogate state immunity to determine that they are reasonably 
necessary to enforce the Fourteenth Amendments prohibitions against deprivations of 
property). 
10. See supra note 8 (indicating serious limitations on Congress's power to abrogate 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). In addition to cases in which Congress, 
despite an attempt, is unable to abrogate under the Court's stringent requirements, abro-
gation is also unavailable in cases where Congress has passed no law attempting to abro-
gate. In both circumstances, by hypothesis, a federal right exists, but its assertion in court 
is frustrated by state immunity. 
11. This doctrinal view would deny-in the absence of state waiver or congressional 
abrogation of state immunity-compensation for harm caused by states' violations of fed-
eral rights not prohibited by an injunction. Consequently, all harm suffered before a 
plaintiff procures an injunction and that suffered afterward, but not covered by the court 
order, would be lost. 
12. 437 U.S. 678 (1978); see infra Part III. 
13. Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1987); see infra notes 70-71 
and accompanying text. 
14. Suits by the federal government are not barred by state immunity. See United 
States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-42 (1965). However, what counts as a suit by the 
federal government for purposes of state immunity is currently the subject of some dispute. 
Private individuals, meeting certain procedural requirements, have been allowed to sue on 
behalf of the United States to recover for certain fraud committed against the United 
States. The proceeds of such suits are shared by the United States and the private party 
initiating the suit, based on a statutory formula. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 
(1994). These parties may be seen as deputized and paid private attorneys general, used to 
supplement limited federal enforcement resources. Currently before the Supreme Court 
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parties,15 (2) by private rights enforceable by individuals, or (3) by 
creation of both. Any private rights simply require a court order to 
make them fully effective against states. 
The emergence of this strong reading of Hutto is not inevitable. 
Hutto may also be read in a weak way or be overruled. The Court's 
recent intense solicitude for the interests of states which violate fed-
eral law makes its limiting of Hutto a real possibility. As discussed 
later, such a turn would best be interpreted, not as a decision about 
states' immunity from suits, but as a return to an earlier Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence, severely limiting the scope of Congress's 
substantive Article I powers to regulate states.16 
is the question of whether such qui tam suits, when brought against states, will be treated as 
suits by the United States, and thus allowed to proceed despite state immunity. SeeVer-
mont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex ret. Stevens, 119 S. Ct. 2391 ( 1999) 
(granting certiorari, inter alia, to determine whether the qui tam suits against states are 
consistent with state immunity and reviewing United States v. Vennont Agency of Natural Re-
sources, 162 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
Peripherally to this Article, but significantly, the case also raises the issue of whether 
qui tam suits, brought against either states or private defendants, are consistent with the 
unalterable constitutional standing requirements of Article III. See Stevens, 119 S. Ct. 2391 
(on the Court's own initiative, directing me parties before it to file supplemental briefs 
addressing the following question: "Does a private person have standing under Article III 
to litigate claims of fraud upon me government?"). 
15. Private enforcement of public schemes takes a variety of forms. Traditionally, Con-
gress has been able to create private interests, short of full blown property rights, to assure 
mat public law schemes are suitably enforced. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 
U.S. 388, 394-99 (1987) (allowing standing to those arguably within the zone of interests 
protected by the enabling act, while noting that the test is not particularly demanding and 
does not require a congressional purpose to benefit the would be plaintiff); FCC v. Sanders 
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (allowing broadcasters standing to challenge the 
statutory legality of grants of licenses to competitors, although they possessed no property 
right to exclude others). Sometimes these private interests conferring standing, yet not 
amounting to property rights, have been described as existing in favor of those explicitly or 
implicitly designated private attorneys general. See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 
U.S. 4, 14 ( 1942). The zone of interests and private attorneys general cases converge. See 
Clarke, 479 U.S. at 397 n.12 (equating those wimin the zone of interest wim mose who 
would be reliable private attorneys generals). 
At one time, Congress's power to confer standing on any individual or group to re-
dress any violation of law seemed possibly limitless. Congress could do so by either stating 
mat a class of people (e.g., all citizens) is injured by a legal violation (illegal pollution 
anywhere) or by designating any group (e.g., all citizens) private attorneys generals to re-
dress such violation. See supra paragraph. Recently, the Court has cut back on me once 
apparently endless power of Congress to grant standing on these meories and seems 
poised to cut back more. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 ( 1992) (holding 
that standing to enforce public law schemes does not exist simply because Congress recog-
nizes an injury but, rather, requires the presence of some minimum harm as recognized by 
me Constitution). 
16. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
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Immediately below, in Part II, this Article describes the Supreme 
Court cases on federalism with a special emphasis on those dealing 
with state immunity from suit. In Part III, it turns to a discussion of 
Hutto which suggests that civil contempt and similar actions may offer 
an alternative, if imperfect, route to compensation. Finally, in Part IV, 
it discusses and evaluates the choices that confront the Court in har-
monizing Alden and other state immunity cases with cases in the Hutto 
line. 
II. REcENT SuPREME CouRT CAsEs oN FEDERALISM 
A. Substantive Federal Power to Regulate States 
While the focus of this Article is state immunity from suit under 
federal law, it will be helpful to discuss briefly the substantive powers 
of Congress to regulate the states, both under the original Constitu-
tion and under the Reconstruction Amendments. This discussion is 
helpful for two reasons. First, as discussed more fully below, Congress 
can eliminate state immunity from suit when regulating states under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, but not when regulating under the Com-
merce Clause. 17 Second, the Court's recent state immunity decisions 
might be seen as an attempt, by other means, to seriously limit a line 
of cases permitting Congress great freedom to regulate states under 
the Commerce Clause. Later in this Article, I suggest that Alden may 
have this effect. 18 In particular, Alden may deny Congress the power 
to create meaningful private rights under powers granted it in the 
original Constitution, most notably the Interstate Commerce Clause. 19 
The civil rights amendments are unusual constitutional provi-
sions, unmistakably contemplating federal regulation operating 
against states with respect to due process, equal protection, voting 
rights and guarantees against slavery.20 But what was and is the power 
17. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (describing the line of decisions end-
ing, for now, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)). 
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII-XV. Each of these amendments is directed at limiting 
states, and each of them ends with a clause authorizing congressional enforcement. See 
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within 
the United States . . . . Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation."); U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. . . . The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); U.S. CoNST. amend. XV ("The right 
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by ... any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. . . . The Congress shall have 
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."). 
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of Congress to regulate states under the original Constitution, particu-
larly the commerce clause? An early opinion, McCulloch v. Maryland, 21 
can be seen as cutting in two different directions. 
Implicit rules, principles, and policies are not always weaker than 
explicit ones. Consider the phrase "it goes without saying," indicating 
that something is so clear that it does not need to be said. Some con-
stitutional law fits this description well. McCulloch v. Marylan~2 pro-
vides the earliest and most powerful example. It holds that state 
legislation that sufficiently threatens the existence or effectiveness of 
the United States is invalid because it is inconsistent with the constitu-
tional enterprise as originally understood, not because it violates a 
specific provision of the document.23 Possibly some federal regula-
tion of states, analogously, is inconsistent with their sovereignty as im-
plicit in the founding document and circumstances. Cutting the 
other way, the theory of representative democracy, discussed in McCul-
loch, might lead to the belief that the states are adequately protected 
against actions of the federal government by their representation in 
Congress while, in general, the citizens of the United States are not 
adequately represented in any single state legislature.24 On this sec-
ond view, a view still officially, if precariously, held by the Supreme 
Court as to most federal regulation of states,25 there are few state sov-
ereignty limits on Congress in regulating states under its Article I 
powers. 
At least from 1936 until 1968, the entire Court seemed to view 
Congress's Article I regulatory powers over states as no more limited 
than those over individuals. 26 When suggestions of special limits 
21. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
22. !d. 
23. !d. at 426-30. 
24. See id. at 431 ("In the legislature of the Union alone, are all represented. The 
legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with the power of 
controlling measures which concern all, in the confidence that it will not be abused."); see 
also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-52 (discussing state 
sovereignty and noting "that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in 
large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress" (footnote omitted)). 
25. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (finding no occasion to 
revisit Garcia). 
26. See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184 (1936) ("The sovereign power of 
the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of grants of power to the federal govern-
ment .... "). Thirty-two years later in Maryland v. Wirlz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), two dissenters 
suggested that there might be some special protection for states from congressional regula-
tory powers. See id. at 204-05 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that if Congress's power 
under the commerce clause extends to permit federal regulation of "essential functions 
being carried on by the States," then the federal government "could devour the essentials 
of state sovereignty"). 
HeinOnline -- 59 Md. L. Rev. 448 2000
448 MARYLAND LAw REVIEW [VoL. 59:440 
favoring states began to appear, they were most intelligible, not as in-
terpretations of Article I's commerce clauses, but as notions that 
either the Tenth Amendment or some very basic yet implicit state sov-
ereignty shielded states from the full force of general federal 
regulation. 27 
Subsequently, the Court has vacillated as to whether, and in what 
circumstances, states themselves can be regulated by federal laws. In 
1976, in National League of Cities v. Usery, 28 the Court first held that 
states could not be regulated under the commerce clause when acting 
traditionally as states.29 Nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority,30 the Court reversed course and held that, 
except in exceptional circumstances, Congress can regulate states 
under the commerce clause in the same way that it regulates individu-
als.31 To be concrete, in the first case the Court rejected, and in the 
second accepted, the application of federal minimum wage laws to 
states.32 In both of these cases, the voting margin was one justice.33 
In Garcia, three dissenters seemed committed to overturning the 
decision. 34 
27. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (noting that the Tenth 
Amendment makes explicit the constitutional policy that "Congress may not exercise 
power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in 
a federal system."); Wim, 392 U.S. at 205 Qustices Douglas and Stewart dissenting, on the 
ground that principles, explicitly guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment, limit what would 
otherwise be Congress's power to regulate under the commerce clause). Later cases such 
as New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996) indicate that the Tenth Amendment and Eleventh Amendment make explicit pro-
tections that were implicit in the original Constitution. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 54 (concluding 
that state sovereign immunity from suit existed implicitly in the original Constitution and 
that the Eleventh Amendment cleared up a misunderstanding as to its existence). As to 
limits on federal powers to regulate states, New York v. United States makes clear that the 
current majority sees the limits as originally implicit and predating the textual amendment 
designed to make their existence, if not their precise content, explicit: 
The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is 
not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have dis-
cussed, is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that 
the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given 
instance, reserve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs us to 
determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by 
a limitation on an Article I power. 
505 U.S. at 156-57. 
28. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
29. Id. at 845, 852. 
30. 469 u.s. 528 (1985). 
31. Id. at 555-57. 
32. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 851-52; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-56. 
33. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 856 (5-4 decision); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (5-4 decision). 
34. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 577 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court's action reflects a 
serious misunderstanding, if not an outright rejection, of the history of our country and 
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Since Garcia, the pendulum has swung away from Garcia and back 
toward National League of Cities, as the Court has grown increasingly to 
favor states' rights. Though it has never overruled Garcia, it has nar-
rowed it somewhat. In two recent cases, a majority identified particu-
lar, and narrow, types of federal legislation that violate states' rights. 
The first is legislation that forces states to enact a specified matter as 
state law35 and the second is legislation that forces state officers to 
administer federally enacted regulatory schemes.36 While the limits 
on substantive regulation of states have moved in the direction of al-
lowing less regulation, the Court has also narrowed, even more dra-
matically, the possibility of remedies for violations of regulations that 
do remain substantively valid. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,37 Seminole v. 
Florida,38 and Alden form this body of case law. It is this body of immu-
nity law that now presses, with special force, the question of the kinds 
of relief that can be granted in favor of an individual and against a 
state for violation of federal court orders. 
B. State Immunity from Suit 
The history of a federal constitutional immunity of states and 
state officers from suits is equally long and even more confusing than 
the flip-flopping story of decisions dealing with the validity of federal 
substantive regulation of states. Below, I outline the most basic fea-
tures of this body of law. While state immunity from suit is often de-
scribed as Eleventh Amendment immunity,39 that amendment turns 
out to play only a supporting role for the constitutional protections 
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution." (footnote omitted)); id. at 580 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out 
further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the 
support of a majority of this Court."); id. at 589 (O'Connor,]., dissenting) (sharing justice 
Rehnquist's belief that "this Court will in time again assume its constitutional 
responsibility"). 
35. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (striking down a federal 
statute that forced states to either take title to low level radioactive waste or to regulate 
pursuant to the direction of Congress). 
36. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that Congress may 
not compel state law enforcement officers to perform background checks on perspective 
gun purchasers pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act). 
37. 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (limiting an exception to state immunity). For a fuller descrip-
tion of this case, see infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
38. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). For a detailed discussion of Seminole, see infra notes 46-61 and 
accompanying text. See also Young, supra note 3. 
39. See generally Young, supra note 3, at 1413, 1413 n.13 (surveying state immunity cases 
and explaining the differences between and the confusion often associated with Hans im-
munity and Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
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that the states' rights majority finds implicit in the original docu-
ment.40 The Eleventh Amendment reads as follows: 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.41 
Read literally, this provision prohibits citizens of any state, A, 
from suing any other state, B, in federal court. On such a reading, it 
has no application to (1) any suits in state court, or (2) suits brought 
by citizens of A against their own state, even if in federal court. Even 
as to suits in federal court by citizens of state A against state B, which 
are literally covered by the Amendment, broader context offers strong 
arguments that the provision does not apply to the extent that such a 
suit is brought to enforce federal law. 42 
Strangely, while state immunity has expanded, the Eleventh 
Amendment itself has played an increasingly smaller role, as the Court 
found another source of the protections for states against suits under 
federal law. As early as 1890 the Court found an immunity connected 
with the Eleventh Amendment, but obviously originating elsewhere, 
which protected states from suits brought against them in federal 
court by their own citizens, even if brought to enforce federallaw.43 
Somewhat simplified, this year's Alden decision extends that implicit 
immunity to suits against states in their own courts.44 More precisely, 
Alden concludes that there is no general federal compulsion for a 
state's courts to hear suits brought against that state based on federal 
40. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
41. U.S. CoNST. amend. XI (emphasis added). 
42. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 281-89 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that the Eleventh Amendment was simply designed to close the 
federal court to suits where jurisdiction was based on party status but not to suits where the 
cause of action arose under federal law); see also John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment 
and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1889, 2004 (1983) (con-
cluding that "[i]t is time for the Supreme Court to acknowledge that the eleventh amend-
ment applies only to cases in which the jurisdiction of the federal court depends solely 
upon party status"); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment and State 
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE LJ. 1, 44-51 (1988) (concluding that neither the original Con-
stitution nor the Eleventh Amendment conferred on states' immunity from suits to enforce 
federal law, but recognizing the possibility that states possessed a federal common law im-
munity that would yield to legislation enforcing federal rights via authorization of suits 
against states). 
43. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 19-21 (1890). 
44. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999) (holding "that the powers dele-
gated to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the 
power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts"). 
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law.45 Seminole and Alden together explain all of this from the states' 
rights majority's perspective. In their view, states have a sovereign im-
munity from suits that was implicitly guaranteed under the original 
Constitution,46 another example of something significant "going with-
out saying" under the Constitution.47 From the states' rights mcyor-
ity's perspective, the Eleventh Amendment simply repaired the 
Supreme Court's one narrow mistake as to the existence of this immu-
nity, so that, after its enactment, states were in the position originally 
intended.48 Specifically, states were in the position of having no fed-
eral obligation to suffer suits brought against them by individuals, 
even those brought to enforce federal law against them in their own 
courts or in federal courts. 
For those who wish to understand this immunity, two related 
questions must be answered. First, what counts as a suit against a 
state? And, second, how can federal law continue to be supreme if 
immunity prevents suits against states which violate that law? 
45. Of course state law-statutory and constitutional-can choose to open state courts 
to federal claims of any sort, except the few that are exclusively cognizable in federal court. 
As for Congress's special power under the Fourteenth (and possibly the Thirteenth, and 
Fifteenth) Amendment to abrogate state immunity, see supra notes 7, 20. Additionally, 
there may be special cases in which state courts are obligated to hear federal claims against 
states despite the lack of a statute specifically abrogating state immunity. See First Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987) (raising the 
possibility that the "just compensation" component of the Fifth Amendment itself, or as 
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment against states, is an unusual provision requir-
ing that governments provide judicial remedies against themselves to compensate for tak-
ing of property); Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, ll0-11 (1994) (indicating that, in some 
circumstances, a state must allow a judicial-style proceeding for a refund of taxes illegally 
collected). 
46. The Seminole Court offered the following explanation: 
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, "we have understood the Eleventh 
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ... 
which it confirms." That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in 
Hans v. Louisiana, has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our 
federal system; and second, that" [i] tis inherent in the nature of sovereignty not 
to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent," .... For over a 
century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsent-
ing States "was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judi-
cial power of the United States." 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (in-
ternal citations omitted). 
47. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
48. See Young, supra note 3, at 1424-25 (noting that "the Seminole Court perceives the 
Eleventh Amendment as merely a correction of Chisholm's mistaken view that the Constitu-
tion permits federal courts to hear suits against states brought by citizens of other states" (foot-
note omitted)). 
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The answer to the first question is that all suits against unconsent-
ing states as named parties are suits against states, barred by immunity 
unless Congress has abrogated that immunity under its Fourteenth 
Amendment powers. Also barred are some suits naming only state 
officers as defendants. 49 The answer to the second is that the 
Supreme Court has made supremacy of federal law meaningful by al-
lowing federal courts to hear most, but not all, suits brought against 
state officers, in their official capacities, to stop them from enforcing 
state policy that violates federal law. 50 It has done so by means of a 
fiction that regards these suits as not against a state, when, obviously, 
they are.51 Any suit that stops an officer from obeying the command 
of a state constitution, the state legislature, or a duly authorized state 
agency, is functionally against the state. State policy needs arms and 
49. Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,665 (1974) (citing, with approval, an opinion of a 
United States court of appeals: "'It is one thing to ... [require a state officer to comply 
with federal law in the future.] It is quite another to order ... [him] to use state funds to 
make reparation for he past. The latter would appear to us to fall afoul of the Eleventh 
Amendment .... ' We agree with Judge McGowan's observations." (citations omitted)). 
50. Compare Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) ("[I]ndividuals, who, as of-
ficers of the State ... threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or 
criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the 
Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action."), 
with Seminole, 517 U.S. at 73-76 (accepting, but slightly limiting, the ability offederal courts 
to enjoin state officers to comply with federal law). 
51. The Court explained the creation of the fiction: 
[T] he injunction in Young was justified, notwithstanding the obvious impact 
on the State itself, on the view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an 
official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or representative 
character," ... This rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that 
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Four-
teenth Amendment but not the Eleventh Amendment. Nonetheless, the Young 
doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate 
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the 
United States." As JusTicE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte Young was the culmi-
nation of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh 
Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere 
in the Constitution." Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young 
doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights. 
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to promote the 
supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity 
of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jordan. We recognized that the 
prospective relief authorized by Young"has permitted the Civil War Amendments 
to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than merely a shield, for those 
whom they were designed to protect." But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to 
encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the constitutional immu-
nity of the States. 
Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104-05 (1984) (emphasis added) 
(internal citations omitted); see also PETER W. Low & JoHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACTIONS: SECTION 1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 871 (2d ed. 1994) (characterizing Ex parte 
Young as resting "on a fictional tour de force"). 
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legs for its execution. In many, but not all circumstances, federal 
courts have been permitted to enjoin state agents who have been duly 
authorized under state law to take action that violates federal law.52 
But which suits against state officers in their official capacities, 
designed to thwart unconstitutional state policy, are acknowledged to 
be against states and thus barred? And which are allowed to go for-
ward cloaked in the fiction that they are not suits against states? This 
question lies at the heart of the present Article, which deals with com-
pensation for those injured by a violation of federal court orders. At 
least until recently, there has been a reasonably clean line between 
those official capacity suits against state officers that were permitted 
and those that were not. 5 3 Suits against officers in their official capaci-
ties, brought to compel future compliance with valid federal laws, 
were allowed to proceed. 54 These actions, usually for a negative in-
junction, but sometimes for a mandatory one, tightly controlling fu-
ture behavior, were called Ex parte Young suits, after the exemplar of 
the category. 5 5 Note that these suits-for example desegregation suits 
and others seeking institutional restructuring-often required great 
expenditures of state money.56 Still they were allowed. 
52. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664-69 (permitting federal courts to issue orders 
against state officers compelling prospective compliance with federal law but not to compel 
them to pay damages out of the state funds for past violations of federal law). 
53. The reasonably clean line was that between prospective suits against state officers to 
e~oin future violations of federal law and suits against officers seeking to compel pay-
ments from the state treasury to compensate plaintiffs for past violations of federal law. 
The first was allowed; the latter barred. See infra notes 54-55, 58 and accompanying text. 
However, the line was always only reasonably clean. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 
(1977) (struggling with the validity of a lower court order, which, in some respects, was 
retrospective and compensatory and in others future-oriented and aimed at assuring con-
tinuing compliance with federal law); Edelman, 415 U.S. 661 (stating that the difference 
between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under 
Ex parte Young will not, in many instances, be that between day and night). 
54. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664. 
55. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (enjoining a state officer from enforcing state 
law violative of the federal Constitution); see Seminole, 517 U.S. at 55 (describing suits seek-
ing such relief against state officers as "brought under Ex Parte Young''); Edelman, 415 U.S. 
at 667 (referring to relief permitted "under Ex Parte Young"). 
56. See Edelman, 415 U.S., at 667-68. The Court in Edelman stated: 
Later cases [after Ex parte Young] from this Court have authorized equitable re-
lief which has probably had greater impact on state treasuries than did that 
awarded in Ex parte Young. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), Arizona 
and Pennsylvania welfare officials were prohibited from denying welfare benefits 
to otherwise qualified recipients who were aliens. In Goldbergv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970), New York City welfare officials were enjoined from following New York 
State procedures which authorized the termination of benefits paid to welfare 
recipients without prior hearing. But the fiscal consequences to state treasuries 
in these cases were the necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their 
terms were prospective in nature. State officials, in order to shape their official 
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On the other side of the line, those prohibited by immunity were 
(1) suits naming an unconsenting state as defendant,57 and (2) all 
suits seeking payment from the state treasury to compensate for past 
wrongs, without state consent. Suits in category (2) are exemplified 
by those brought to redress torts and breaches of contract. Note that 
such suits were forbidden despite the naming of a state officer in his 
official capacity, instead of the state, as the party defendant.58 
This line-between the forbidden compensation suits and the 
permitted ones seeking prospective relief-remains fairly clean, 
although it has been blurred slightly by the recent Coeur d'Alene case. 
Coeur d'Alene holds that, in addition to suits aimed at making state 
officers compensate individuals out of state funds, a small set of other 
suits against state officers implicate state sovereignty to such a degree 
that they will be classified as against a state and thus barred by immu-
nity. 59 Despite this and some very troubling statements from two of 
the states' rightsjustices,60 Ex parte Young suits remain generally avail-
able to those injured by states' violations of federal law. The focus of 
this Article is what, ultimately, does such an injunction mean? Can 
federal courts, in civil contempt proceedings, force a state to compen-
sate private parties for the harm resulting from a state's violation of 
the injunction which protected them? 
Alden and Seminole make this question crucial because, before 
they were decided, alternative avenues of relief were open or arguably 
open to plaintiffs seeking damages against states. Seminole eliminates 
one such avenue by reversing an earlier case that permitted Congress 
to abrogate states' immunity from suits that assert rights created 
conduct to the mandate of the Court's decrees, would more likely have to spend 
money from the state treasury than if they had been left free to pursue their 
previous course of conduct. Such an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a 
permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in 
nx parte Young. ... 
/d. (footnote omitted) (internal citations omitted). 
57. See id. at 663. 
58. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72; see also supra note 3. 
59. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 285-88 (1997) (holding that certain 
suits against state officers to quiet title to land and which implicate major state interests are 
outside of the exception to state immunity and thus barred). 
60. Parts of Justice Kennedy's opinion (otherwise for the majority), joined only by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, advocated making the availability of an Ex parte Young remedy 
depend upon a balancing test which included as one factor the availability of relief in state 
courts. /d. at 270-88 (Opinion of Kennedy, j.). For the disagreement of Justices 
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas on this point see id. at 288, stating that Ex parte Young suits 
are presumptively within the federal courts jurisdiction, and not barred by principles of 
federalism including immunity. 
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under Article I. 61 So congressional action is no longer a means for 
providing compensation for such rights-holders, although it remains 
viable for federal laws written to enforce Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. A remaining possibility was suing in state courts, which argu-
ably had a federal obligation to be open to compensate holders of 
rights created under Article 1.62 Alden closes this avenue of redress 
against states for violation of rights based solely on Article I. As a re-
sult, the possibility of compensation for harm resulting from a state's 
violation of an injunction protecting such rights takes on a new impor-
tance. It is one of the last two possible avenues for compensation 
short of constitutional amendment. The first remaining possibility is 
that some rights created under Article I, when vested, will fall under 
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment and the power of Con-
gress to do away with state immunity in enforcing that amendment. 63 
My topic is the other possible avenue for relief: an Ex parte Young 
injunction followed by civil contempt proceedings. 
III. Hurro v. HNNEY AND LoWER CouRT CAsEs: FACTS 
AND AMBIGUITIES 
A. Hutto's Endorsement of Compensation for Private Victims of State 
Defiance of Federal Injunctions 
In Hutto v. Finney,64 the Supreme Court considered objections by 
the State of Arkansas to the decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirming a federal district court's 
award of attorneys' fees against the state for bad faith violation of the 
district court's earlier prison reform orders. 65 While part of the award 
was made under a civil rights attorneys' fee statute, which was found to 
abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity,66 a portion of 
the award was based solely on the powers of federal courts to enforce 
61. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
62. See RicHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL CouRTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1076 (4th ed. 1996) (raising the question, answered affirmatively later 
in Alden, as to whether state courts are generally free to refuse to hear federal law suits 
brought against their sovereigns). 
63. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
64. 437 u.s. 678 (1978). 
65. See id. at 680-85 (considering the court of appeals decision to uphold $20,000 in 
attorneys' fees to be paid out of Department of Correction funds). 
66. See id. at 693-96 (concluding that the $2500 in attorneys' fees, levied by the court of 
appeals pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, is not barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment). 
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their own orders.67 This portion served not only to deter violations of 
the original court order but to compensate private parties (in this case 
prisoners' attorneys) for harms caused by the violations subsequent to 
the injunction68 (in this case unreimbursed fees for work that would 
not have been done if the original order had been honored). The 
Supreme Court found that the portion of the fees not covered by the 
statute was allowable as in the nature of a civil contempt award. Em-
phasizing that the Ex parte Young line of cases permits official-capacity 
injunctive suits to stop continuing violations of federal law the Court 
continued: 
Once issued, an injunction may be enforced. Many of the 
court's most effective enforcement weapons involve financial 
penalties. A criminal contempt prosecution for "resistance 
to [the court's] lawful ... order" may result in a jail term or a 
fine. 
The principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amend-
ment doctrine surely do not require federal courts to en-
force their decrees only by sending high state officials to jail. 
The less intrusive power to impose a fine is properly treated 
as ancillary to the federal court's power to impose injunctive 
relief. 
In this case, the award of attorney's fees for bad faith 
served the same purpose as a remedial fine imposed for civil 
contempt. 
Instead of assessing the award against the defendants in 
their official capacities, the District Court directed that the 
fees are "to be paid out of Department of Correction 
funds." 69 
In a post-Hutto court of appeals case, reading Hutto correcdy as 
ranging beyond claims seeking attorneys' fees, the court saw Hutto as 
supporting its decision that state funds must be used to compensate a 
hospital injured by a state's failure to honor a consent decree that it 
67. See id. at 689-93 (considering whether the district court's award of attorneys' fees 
for the State's failure to comply with the court's injunction is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment). 
68. /d. at 691 n.l7 ("That the award had a compensatory effect does not in any event 
distinguish it from a fine for civil contempt, which also compensates a private party for the 
consequences of a contemnor's disobedience." (citation omitted)). 
69. /d. at 690-92 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (footnote omit-
ted). Of the material omitted from the above quotation, some suggests that there may be 
limits on forcing state officers to compensate private parties from state funds for violation 
of federal court orders intended to protect those private parties. 
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agreed to in federal district court.7° For the unanimous panel Judge 
Richard Posner stated: 
[T] he district court [below] found that the state had violated 
the consent decree. If this finding is correct, the Eleventh 
Amendment is no bar to ordering the state to reimburse the 
hospitals at the higher rate they seek, for the period ... dur-
ing which the consent decree was in effect. Against a state 
that violates a valid federal court decree the court has the 
power to issue any order necessary to enforce the decree, 
including an order to pay. Hutto v. Finney. . . . Whether one 
calls such an order one of civil contempt or, as we would 
prefer out of comity to characterize it, an equitable supple-
ment to the consent decree, it is within the power of the fed-
eral court to make.71 
B. Ambiguities in Hutto 
On careful reading, Hutto is a strong, but not unalloyed, endorse-
ment of use of the federal contempt power to compensate those in-
jured by states' refusals to comply with federal court injunctions 
enforcing federal law on behalf of private beneficiaries. In approving 
the attorneys' fees, the Court made some observations that, at the 
least, made Hutto an easier decision by eliminating some factors that 
might have strengthened the state's claims to immunity. These fac-
tors, while themselves ambiguous to some degree, cast light on how 
the Court might narrow Hutto, thus expanding state immunity: 
70. See Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1987). 
71. /d. at 868 (citation omitted). Judge Posner further explained the rationale underly-
ing the court's decision: 
/d. 
We do not suggest that by consenting to the original decree the defendants 
waived the state's rights under the Eleventh Amendment. The decree did not 
engage the Eleventh Amendment. The decree settled a genuine, noncollusive 
case that was within the exception to the Eleventh Amendment that Ex parte 
Young created, and it was a proper settlement that didn't violate anybody's rights. 
Compare Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Dunn v. 
Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1986). Nor did the order that we have called an 
equitable supplement expand the scope of the decree, as in Lelsz. v. Kavanagh, 807 
F.2d 1243, 1252 (5th Cir. 1987). If it did, the expanded portion might be within 
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment. But all the order did was coerce (or at-
tempt to coerce) compliance with the decree; and, as we have said, if a decree is 
valid an order enforcing it is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. A fine for 
contempt, payable by the defendants in their official capacities (and therefore by 
the state itself, as we said), would have been within the power of the district court. 
See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 690-92. 
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(1) compensation was not the sole motive for awarding the 
fees, but, as with civil contempt awards, the compensation 
also served as a penalty for failure to follow a federal court's 
order72 
' (2) while the district court provided some compensation in 
making the award, it said that it would "make no effort to 
adequately" compensate for harm done as a result of the vio-
lation of the court order; 73 
(3) there was no contention that the award was "so large or 
so unexpected that it [would interfere] with the State's 
budgeting process," indicating that the Eleventh Amend-
ment "may counsel moderation in determining the size of 
the award or in giving the State time to adjust its budget 
before paying the full amount of the fee"; 74 and 
( 4) the state did not claim that the award "was larger than 
necessary to enforce the court's prior orders."75 
In considering what these observations may portend, it is impor-
tant to observe that the Court did not say that any of them were neces-
sary to the validity of a compensatory award. It simply made it clear 
that the absence of the factors mentioned made approving the award 
an easier decision. As a result, there are two main ways that a court 
adhering to Hutto could apply it to future, more difficult, cases, 
although there are many possible nuanced positions in between. Be-
low I will present the alternatives and in the next section evaluate 
them. 
The first reading (below, the "strong reading of Hutto") would be 
a presumptive full compensation model. It would assume that benefi-
ciaries of Ex parte Young injunctions, ignored by a state in bad faith, 
would be fully compensated, absent some especially potent problems 
of federalism. On this reading, the cautionary statements in Hutto 
would be analyzed as follows. The first factor-requiring that the 
court's contempt order be partially punitive76-adds nothing. All civil 
contempt awards that compensate also have punitive motives designed 
to compel observance of federal court orders. 
The second factor-that the fee award was only partially compen-
satory77-can be dismissed as not necessary to the decision. The Hutto 
Court makes clear that it was not reviewing a fully compensatory 
72. See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 691-93. 
73. See id. at 691. 
74. Id. at 692 n.18 (citing Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666 n.ll (1974)). 
75. Id. 
76. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
77. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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award78 and so if its statements were somehow taken as forbidding 
such awards, they are dicta. More significantly, the Court does not 
seem to have issued such dicta. Its observation that the award was not 
fully compensatory may be seen as postponing a decision concerning 
the general validity of civil contempt orders aimed at awarding full 
compensation in favor of those protected by an injunction and against 
a state which violates it. 
Mter Hutto, it remains possible that full compensation is the 
norm, but that a state might establish some sort of justification as to 
why its sovereignty interests permit it to inflict injury in violation of a 
federal i~unction and without compensation to the party protected 
by the federal court order. One such justification could take into con-
sideration the third factor79 cited by the Hutto Court, that the award in 
that case was not unexpected or massive. Perhaps some awards 
against states might be disallowed or limited upon the state's demon-
strating surprising or devastating harm to its fiscal well-being, 
although this possibility raises difficulties discussed below.80 
Finally, the fourth factor-that the contempt order do no more 
than is necessary to enforce the prior orderB1-could be read to in-
clude presumptive full compensation in the notion of "enforcement" 
of an injunction. From this perspective, a fully compensating award, 
by definition, would not be larger than necessary to '"enforce' the 
court's prior orders." The assumption of compensation makes this 
view a private rights model. 
However, a weak reading of Hutto--a public rights view-is also 
possible. This weak reading will occur if the Court ultimately gives 
more bite to the cautionary factors as they come into play in future 
cases. On this view, it is always future deterrence that is the para-
mount factor in making an award. Once harm is done, whether from 
the initial violation of a federal right or from one or more violations 
of federal court i~unctions protecting such a right, the court must 
estimate what monetary penalty will bring the state into compliance, 
and then, secondarily, it may use such amount to compensate injured 
beneficiaries of the original court order. If already leaning in this 
way, one might read the first cautionary factor in Hutto as suggesting 
that deterrence is primary and that compensation is secondary. Like-
wise, the second factor, that the court did not attempt to provide full 
compensation for the harm done, may be read as consistent with the 
78. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 691. 
79. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
80. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. 
81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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existence of nothing resembling a private right to compensation. The 
third factor-the absence of either a budgetary surprise or a massive 
award-does leave a lot to future definition. It is consistent, however, 
either with the view that these considerations limit even the courts' 
power to deter future violations or perhaps that they are problems 
that normally exist only when a court has gone far beyond what is 
necessary to insure future compliance. 
Finally, on this model, the fourth factor-a court's not going be-
yond what is necessary to "enforce" its prior order-means not going 
beyond what is necessary to insure a reasonable likelihood of future 
compliance, regardless of whether compensation has been achieved. 
In short, despite a state's great recalcitrance and its multiple violations 
of a federal injunction, followed in each case by judicial reiteration, 
an injured party is never entitled to full compensation for any of the 
violations. On this model, the focus, after each violation, is on coerc-
ing the state to honor the injunction in the (then) future, whether 
what is necessary is a fine less than, equal to or greater than the in-
jured party's harm. The fact that the sum exacted is paid to the in-
jured party is secondary to the primary focus on coercion. 
N. THE FuTURE OF HuTTO 
What will the current Court's approach be to the issues raised by 
Hutto? Up to the time of the Court's recent cases on state immunity, it 
found itself pulled in opposite directions by what it saw as the compet-
ing claims of supremacy of federal law and of state sovereignty inter-
ests. As described above, the compromise that it reached partially 
addressed functional interests of the states and partly their symbolic, 
dignitary interests. The functional protections were aimed at protect-
ing a state from undue, and often unpredictable, fiscal difficulties. 
Specifically, states were protected from having to pay damages from 
their treasuries to compensate individuals for their past wrongs, re-
gardless of whether the named defendant was the state itself or was an 
officer sued in his official capacity.82 
The symbolic protections were those forbidding the naming of a 
state as a party, regardless of the relief sought.83 This compromise, 
admitted to involve a fiction, permitted suits against federal officers to 
compel future compliance with federallaw.84 To this considerable ex-
tent federal supremacy won out, but with the original face-saving pre-
82. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
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tense, now abandoned even as pretense,85 that such suits are not 
against states, when of course, they are. 
Once Seminole and Alden eliminated other possibilities for com-
pensation for violation of rights created under Article 1,86 the ques-
tion became whether federal courts can protect holders of such rights 
from harm caused by state violations. The strong view of Hutto does 
allow such protection. Despite the Court's aversion to forcing states 
to compensate, that view has many virtues as a compromise position. 
It protects both the functional and the dignitary interests of states as 
identified in the Supreme Court's state immunity jurisprudence, while 
at the same time offering protection to federal rights holders and ac-
cording dignity to federal court orders. 
First, as to the functional interests of states, Hutto sees concern 
with "[excessively] large or unexpected" awards against states.87 An 
injunction ameliorates surprise and difficulties of adjustment to fed-
eral law by giving states notice of what is expected. Mter an injunc-
tion issues, the state either can stop the offending conduct or make 
the fiscal preparations necessary to pay for the harm caused by its vio-
lation. Indeed injunctions could be designed to provide notice at any 
appropriate level of state government. Hutto also may be seen as rais-
ing concern about the size of an award against a state, whether or not 
the making of the award or its size surprises the state. It is debatable 
whether legitimate questions of federalism are raised by the size of an 
award against a state for a clear violation of a federal court order, 
particularly if the order was not overturned on appeal after it was vio-
lated.88 But even if one thinks that large awards are problematic, it 
85. See supra note 51. 
86. See Alden v. Maine, ll9 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999) (holding that Article I, operating 
alone, does not grant Congress the authority to create rights enforceable against uncon-
senting states in state courts); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66, 72-73 (1996) 
(holding that Article I, operating alone, does not grant Congress the authority to create 
rights enforceable in federal court against unconsenting states). However, it is possible, in 
some circumstances, for Congress to create rights under Article I that become property 
rights which, in some circumstances, will be the legitimate objects of Congress's Four-
teenth-Amendment power to abrogate state immunity. See supra note 8. 
87. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 692 n.18 (1978). 
88. There is normally a duty to obey court orders, even those later overturned on ap-
peal. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 313-19 (1967) (surveying decisions 
regarding compliance with injunctions). Walker, however, makes it clear that exceptions 
may be made for compelling circumstances. Id. at 318-19 (noting exceptions such as 
"where a procedural requirement ... [is] sprung upon an unwary litigant when prior 
practice didn't give him fair notice of its existence" (citation omitted)). The states' rights 
majority might see the position of states as compelling in this regard, relieving them of the 
normal obligation to obey an erroneous order until it is overturned. Taking the strong 
view of state immunity by reading Hutto as not allowing fully compensatory civil contempt 
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might still be possible to limit them so that, as in Hutto, they are paid 
from funds allocated to the department of the state government in 
which the violation occurred. 89 While this compromise position 
might still pinch a state hard, it is not the same as requiring a state to 
compensate out of general treasury funds. 
Second, the requirement of a court order serves the symbolic or 
dignitary state interests that are so important to the states' rights ma-
jority. Third, the requirement of a court order is not just any symbol 
in service of those dignitary interests. One can argue forcefully that, if 
the courts are open to Ex parte Young suits, then dignitary interests of 
the federal courts require that those courts be able to force states vio-
lating court orders to compensate victims who were intended by Con-
gress to be rights holders. This is not an argument that such suits 
would be advisory opinions if compensation were ruled out,90 for vio-
lation of court orders could have consequences other than state pay-
ment of damages, as Justices Rehnquist and White suggested in Hutto 
itself.91 Any of these, such as the possibility of enforcement by a crimi-
nal contempt proceeding or a civil damage suit brought against the 
officer in his personal capacity, would suffice to make the order 
nonadvisory. 
But Article III has many requirements going beyond prohibition 
of advisory opinions.92 Federal courts should be able to treat victims 
of state action, who win injunctions under federal law, as protegees, 
offering them assurance that no further harm will be inflicted without 
compensation. At the very least, this should be true if ( 1) Congress 
intends the parties to be full beneficiaries of federal rights and not 
just private attorneys-general, (2) Congress acts in accordance with 
substantive constitutional law in creating the right and, perhaps, (3) 
the size of the award or other unusual circumstances do not pose 
proceedings against states, goes beyond calVing out a states rights exception to Walker. It 
relieves states of some of the normal consequences of disobeying a contempt order, even 
after the time for appeals has run or after it has been affirmed by a United States court of 
appeals or by the Supreme Court. 
89. See PETER H. ScHUCK, SuiNG GoVERNMENT 103-09 (1983) (discussing the pros and 
cons of imposing liability on governmental entities from particular agencies, at one end of 
the continuum, to the state itself at the other). 
90. For a discussion of what are advisory opinions and why they are prohibited, see 
FALLON ET AL., supra note 62, at 93-98. 
91. See Hutto 437 U.S. at 716 (Justices Rehnquist and White, dissenting). 
92. For example, that the federal courts not be used as puppets by Congress, see United 
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128 (1871), or that courts not be assigned nonjudicial 
duties ranging beyond the rendering of advisory opinions. See also Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654, 680-85 ( 1988) (suggesting that a statute authorizing close court supeiVision of the 
Independent Counsel would be constitutionally suspect). 
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some sort of catastrophic harm to the interests of states in a balanced 
federalism. 
This is not to say the Court will read Hutto as strongly as Judge 
Posner did in the Reivitz case.93 But denying compensation for viola-
tions of court orders that enforce federal laws written under Article I 
would not be understood best as a decision about state immunity from 
suit. In reality, it would be a substantive trip backwards to National 
League of Cities and beyond, denying the creation of private rights 
against states, even when they stop acting most like states and enter 
the marketplace. It would suggest that Congress cannot, in pursuit of 
Article I objective, create private rights that are good against states. 
On this view, as versus states, Nike's Ex parte Young action would 
be brought, not by a rights holder, but by a self-interested private at-
torney general, allowed to proceed to keep the world safe for all trade-
mark holders. Violations of any injunction would be attended by 
criminal contempt penalties or by civil contempt proceedings that are 
not aimed in any substantial way at providing compensation to the 
i~ured plaintiff. If that is the Court's regrettable course, it would be 
preferable for it to be clear that it is revisiting Garcia and making a 
statement about the scope of Congress's regulatory powers over states 
and not about the options available to an Article III court when con-
fronted with violations of its orders protecting rights holders. 
93. See supra Section III.B (discussing a "weak reading" of Hutto after discussing a 
"strong reading"). 
